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NEW YORK'S PLAIN ENGLISH LAW
I. Introduction
Legalese, the language found in most legal documents, has be-
come a tradition and trademark of the legal profession. Legalese
includes words whose meanings are not commonly understood, con-
voluted sentences, and shoddy organization. There are several rea-
sons for the development of legalese. Each profession develops its
own jargon. When use of the jargon is confined within the profes-
sion, it serves as a worthwhile device for condensation and preci-
sion.' When this language is extended to consumer contracts, how-
ever, a lawyer is needed to translate the contract. Another factor
contributing to the development of legalese is overkill, that is, the
excess of precision resulting from a desire to be unambiguous.' Over-
kill, however, often results in imprecision or obscurity to the ordi-
nary consumer.3 Lawyers may also derive a sense of superiority over
laymen through the use of language understandable only to them.4
In recent years, there has been much concern over the abuse of
the English language.' Legalese has not escaped criticism.6 While
the use of legalese may be justifiable within the profession in large
business transactions, its use in consumer contracts and leases is
now open to question. Given this concern with legalese, legislative
action in the area of consumer contracts was inevitable. New York
is the first state to pass legislation requiring plain language in con-
sumer transactions.7 Originally passed in 1977,1 New York's Plain
English Law was amended in 1978,1 and became effective November
1, 1978.1" This Note will examine New York's Plain English Law,
1. Givens, The "Plain English" Law, 50 N.Y.S.B.J. 479, 512 (1978).
2. E. BISKIND, SIMPLIFY LEGAL WRITING 4 (2d ed. 1977).
3. Id. at 3. See Davis, Protecting Consumers from Overdisclosure and Gobbledygook: An
Empirical Look at the Simplification of Consumer-Credit Contracts, 63 VA. L. REV. 841
(1975).
4. Givens, The "Plain English" Law, 50 N.Y.S.B.J. 479, 512 (1978).
5. See, e.g., E. NEWMAN, STRICTLY SPEAKING (1974).
6. See, e.g., D. MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW (1963); E. BISKIND, SIMPLIFY LEGAL
WRITING (2d ed. 1975).
7. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-702 (McKinney Supp. 1978).
8. 1977 N.Y. Laws ch. 747.
9. 1978 N.Y. Laws ch. 199.
10. The statute reads:
a. Every written agreement entered into after November first, nineteen hundred
seventy-eight, for the lease of space to be occupied for residential purposes, or to which
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report on its effects and discuss the reception it has received to date.
II. New York's Plain English Law
Influential in the origin of New York's Plain English Bill was
Citibank's simplification of its consumer credit contracts in January
1975.11 Citibank had found that a whole new approach to consumer
contracts was required. Their contracts had been modeled on com-
mercial contracts which are drafted to avoid all ambiguity and to
foresee every possible contingency.'" The result was incomprehen-
sible to the average consumer. Citibank realized that important
a consumer is a party and the money, property or service which is the subject of the
transaction is primarily for personal, family or household purposes must be:
1. Written in a clear and coherent manner using words with common and every day
meanings;
2. Appropriately divided and captioned by its various sections.
Any creditor, seller or lessor who fails to comply with this subdivision shall be liable
to a consumer who is a party to a written agreement governed by this subdivision in
an amount equal to any actual damages sustained plus a penalty of fifty dollars. The
total class action penalty against any such creditor, seller or lessor shall not exceed
ten thousand dollars in any class action or series of class actions arising out of the use
by a creditor, seller or lessor of an agreement which fails to comply with this subdivi-
sion. No action under this subdivision may be brought after both parties to the agree-
ment have fully performed their obligation under such agreement, nor shall any credi-
tor, seller or lessor who attempts in good faith to comply with this subdivision be liable
for such penalties. This subdivision shall not apply to agreements involving amounts
in excess of fifty thousand dollars nor prohibit the use of words or phrases or forms of
agreement required by state or federal law, rule or regulation or by a governmental
instrumentality.
b. A violation of the provisions of subdivision a of this section shall not render any
such agreement void or voidable nor shall it constitute:
1. A defense to any action or proceeding to enforce such agreement; or
2. A defense to any action or proceeding for breach of such agreement.
c. In addition to the above, whenever the attorney general finds that there has been
a violation of this section, he may proceed as provided in subdivision twelve of section
sixty-three of the executive law.
11. Telephone interview with Assemblyman Peter M. Sullivan, the sponsor of the bill
(Sept. 18, 1979). Citibank hired Siegel & Gale, a New York based communications and design
consulting firm, to redesign and consolidate their forms. Vice-President Carl Felsenfeld was
in charge of the Citibank program and worked with Siegel on the revision process. Siegel &
Gale's initial suggestion that the text be revised was met with opposition and severe trepida-
tion. Siegel, To Lift the Curse of Legalese-Simplify, Simplify, 14 ACROSS THE BOARD 64, 69
(June 1977). Nevertheless, the forms were prepared and first put into use in January 1975.
Alan Siegel, President of Siegel & Gale, says his objective was to make the forms comprehen-
sible to the consumer without sacrificing the legal force of the original text. Id. at 66.
12. Siegel, To Lift the Curse of Legalese-Simplify, Simplify, 14 ACROSS THE BOARD 64,
66 (June 1977).
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distinctions between commercial and consumer contracts deserved
recognition at the drafting stage. 3 In large business deals, all fore-
seeable occurrences should be provided for, but in consumer con-
tracts the danger of obscurity outweighs the protective value of
these disclosures. Accordingly, Citibank found it could eliminate
many protective clauses which were rarely, if ever, utilized, 4 as well
as language which clarified meanings for lawyers but only baffled
consumers.'5 The format of the contract forms was altered to facili-
tate reading by the consumer." The contract finally drafted was
designed to explain the consumer's obligation rather than to protect
the creditor. Citibank's revised consumer contracts proved that
legal documents could be simplified without impairing their valid-
ity or enforceability. 7 The New York Legislature thus realized that
contracts written in plain English were not only desirable but also
attainable.
The New York statute requires certain written agreements 8 to be
written in a "clear and coherent manner" using words which are
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. C. FELSENFELD & A. SIEGEL, SIMPLIFIED CONSUMER CREDIT FORMS ix-x (1978). To in-
crease clarity and readability, Citibank also made significant changes in style. They switched
to active verbs, employed a personal tone, and tried to shorten sentences and use contrac-
tions. An example is the substitution of "I'll be in default if I don't pay an installment on
time," for the traditional:
In the event of default in the payment of this or any other Obligation or the perform-
ance or observance of any term or covenant contained herein or in any note or other
contract or agreement evidencing or relating to any Obligation or any Collateral on the
Borrower's part to be performed or observed; or the undersigned Borrower shall die;
or any of the undersigned become insolvent or make as assignment for the benefit of
creditors; or a petition shall be filed by or against any of the undersigned under any
provision of the Bankruptcy Act; or any money, securities or property of the under-
signed now or hereafter on deposit with or in the possession or under the control of the
Bank shall be attached or become subject to distraint proceedings or any order or
process of any court; or the Bank shall deem itself to be insecure, then and in any such
event, the Bank shall have the right (at its option), without demand or notice of any
kind, to declare all or any part of the Obligations to be immediately due and payable.
Design improvements included large type size and divisions with headings in boldface type.
Id.
16. Id. at x-xi.
17. According to Vice-President Felsenfeld, Citibank has not been involved in any litiga-
tion over the new contracts and has not lost any money. Siegel, Plain English Results, N.Y.
Times, April 1, 1979, § 3 (Bus. and Fin.), at 1, col. 6.
18. The statute covers leases and consumer agreements for personal, family or household
purposes. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-702(a) (McKinney Supp. 1978).
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commonly understood. Agreements also must be divided into sec-
tions and captioned where appropriate for clarity and readability.
Violators are liable to the consumer for actual damages plus a fifty
dollar penalty.
The statute contains provisions designed to protect businesses
from large losses. The statute applies only to contracts involving less
than fifty thousand dollars. The penalty for class actions is limited
to ten thousand dollars. If both parties have performed their obliga-
tions fully, no suit lies under the statute. A good faith attempt to
comply is a complete defense to penalties, but not to actual dam-
ages." In addition, violations do not void the agreements and may
not be used as a defense to actions for breach or for enforcement of
the agreement.20
The 1978 amendments made several changes in the original law.
The "non-technical language" requirement was removed allowing
words technical in nature but commonly understood. The amend-
ments specified that the statute does not forbid words required by
other laws or regulations. The statute clarified the rule that the ten
thousand dollar limit on class actions applies to multiple class ac-
tions for the same violation.2' In addition, enforcement authority
was given to the Attorney General of New York.22
It has been suggested that New York's statute is based on the
common law. There must be mutuality of consent to form a contract
under common law. 3 Therefore, courts have held that a party can-
not be bound to terms of a contract which he does not understand.,
This common law principle, however, is employed only after a mis-
understanding has occurred. 5 The Plain English Law, on the other
19. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-702(a) (McKinney Supp. 1978).
20. Id. § 5-702(b).
21. Id. § 5-702(a).
22. Id. § 5-702(c).
23. 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 2 (1957).
24. Sandier v. Commonwealth Station Co., 307 Mass. 470, 30 N.E. 2d 389 (1940); Hen-
ningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A. 2d 69 (1960) and authorities cited. In
both cases, the court refused to give effect to disclaimer clauses because they were not likely
to have been understood by the consumers involved. The Restatement of Contracts states
that consumers are not expected to understand or even read all the terms in a form agree-
ment. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237 Comment b (1973). A court has the power
to strike down unknown clauses which are unconscionable or beyond the range of reasonable
expectation. Id. § 234.
25. 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 2 (1957).
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hand, serves as a preventive measure. At common law, while the
language of the contract may be some evidence of whether there has
been comprehension, agreement, not comprehensibility is the ulti-
mate issue."5 The New York statute looks to the language used
rather than at the absence of agreement. In this way the law seeks
to avoid misunderstandings before they occur.27 The objective stan-
dard allows any party to the agreement to sue28 without any inquiry
into the issue of agreement.
The New York law does not void the contract or restrict the
seller's rights. Instead, it provides for a monetary penalty and dam-
ages. 29 The New York law could be considered an extension of
the principle behind section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial
Code which gives courts the power to deny enforcement of "uncon-
scionable" clauses or contracts." The stated principle is "preven-
tion of oppression and unfair surprise."'" More closely akin to the
statute is the Uniform Consumer Credit Code 2 which allows a
court to enjoin "unconscionable" conduct and award damages and
specifically includes "inability to understand the language of the
agreement" in the standards of unconscionability. Also related is
section 235-c of New York's Real Property Lawu which allows
courts to invalidate all or parts of unconscionable leases. While
there have never been any cases which declared legalese "uncon-
scionable," it is arguable that the statutes lend themselves to this
reading.
26. Id.
27. By analogy, ticketing everyone who is caught running a red light is a much more
effective means of accident prevention than the imposition of a steeper fine on those whose
actions actually cause an accident.
28. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-702(a) (McKinney Supp. 1978).
29. Id.
30. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978).
31. Id. Comment 1.
32. First promulgated in 1968, the Uniform Consumer Credit Code has been revised and
the original code has only been adopted by seven states. In the Spring of 1972, the New York
Law Revision Commission rejected the Code for New York. Final drafts of the U.C.C.C. were
released in 1974. D. ROTHSCHILD & D. CARROLL, CONSUMER PROTECTION: TEXT AND MATERIALS
665 (2d ed. 1977).
33. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.108(4)(e) (1974).
34. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-c (McKinney Supp. 1978). See UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL
LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 1.303; Comment, Leasehold Unconscionability: Caveat Lessor,
7 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 337 (1978).
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III. Areas of Concern
A. Vagueness and Overbreadth of the Standard
The most frequently heard complaint about the Plain English
Law is that the standard it sets is unreasonably vague and ambigu-
ous.15 The standard is "written in a clear and coherent manner using
words with common and every day meanings," and "appropriately
divided and captioned by its various sections. ' 3 Critics claim that
this standard is too subjective and that businesses which make good
faith efforts to comply will be liable for large penalties and unlim-
ited damages. 7 It was feared that forms would become much more
lengthy and unmanageable and might even lose enforceability when
lawyers could no longer rely on "established" court meanings of
terms of legalese.
The New York legislature chose a broad standard in enacting the
Plain English Law on the assumption that the law's goals would
thereby be more effectively implemented. Unlike a strict standard
which sets specific guidelines, 38 a broad standard would permit
courts to interpret the law according to the particular facts of each
case.39 Additionally, a broad standard would not require the delega-
tion of a regulatory agency to approve forms which might be neces-
sary if a strict standard was adopted."
An illustration of the problems with a strict standard is the Fed-
eral Truth in Lending Act." The Act governs all consumer credit
transactions and was an attempt to assure a meaningful disclosure
of credit terms so that consumers could compare various terms
available to them, avoid the uninformed use of credit, and protect
35. See Friedman, The Plain English Law-Amended, But Not Improved, N.Y.L.J., June
22, 1978, at 1, col., 1; Report of the N.Y. County Law. Ass'n, Special Committee on Consumer
Agreements 1 (Nov. 7, 1977); Report of the N.Y.S.B. Ass'n, Banking Corp. & Bus. Law
Section 1; Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N. Y., Committee on State Legislation, Bull. No. 8,
Memo No. 309 at 961.
36. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW4§ 5-702(a)(1)(2) (McKinney Supp. 1978).
37. See reports cited in note 35 supra.
38. For example, specific guidelines could limit numbers of syllables per word, numbers
of words per sentence, require specific language or require minimum scores on readability
scales.
39. See Siegel, Plain English Results, N.Y. Times, April 1, 1979. § 3 (Bus. and Fin.) at 1,
col. 6.
40. The Federal Reserve Board enforces the Truth in Lending Act.
41. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1666 (1976).
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consumers against unfair credit practices.2 It requires the use of the
terms "finance charge" and "annual percentage rate" and man-
dates disclosures about every aspect of the credit transaction.
This Act has been criticized as too complex"3 by both consumers
and creditors. Consumers have found total disclosure to be more
baffling than enlightening." Creditors have complained about the
ensuing flood of regulations, the resulting inflexibility of terms and
burdensome lawsuits for minor infractions." Furthermore, the
Truth in Lending Act is concerned only with contracts for the exten-
sion of consumer credit. A Plain English Law with more precise
standards would be even more complex because it covers such a
broad range of contracts.
The standard chosen by the New York State legislature is benefi-
cial for several reasons. The broad, imprecise standard is not a new
concept in the art of drafting laws. Standards such as
"reasonableness,"" "good faith,"47 and "unconscionable"" are com-
mon in modern legislation. Most laws which establish a standard for
language employ a broad standard."
Furthermore, the broad standard can be adjusted to provide for
justice in varying circumstances. Another vital feature of a broad
standard is its ability to encourage compliance without stifling free-
dom and creativity. It affords maximum protection to the consumer
without unduly interfering with freedom of contract. Fears of injus-
tice in enforcement are not well founded. Judges are inclined to be
hesitant to find violations, especially at the outset, while the con-
42. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (1976).
43. Siegel, To Lift the Curse of Legalese-Simplify, Simplify, 14 AcRoss THE BOARD 64,
69 (June, 1977).
44. Id.
45. Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Special Committee on Consumer Affairs, The
Plain Language Law, 33 THE RECORD 160, 161-62 (1978).
46. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (1976); N.Y. PERS. PRop. LAW §
429(3) (McKinney 1976).
47. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1978); The Fair Credit Billing Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1666i(a) (1976);
Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(f) (1976).
48. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978); U.C.C.C. § 5.108 (1974).
49. See, e.g., The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 which requires plans
to be "written in a manner calculated to be understood by the average plan participant." 29
U.S.C. § 1022(a)(1) (1976). The standard of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act is "simple
and readily understood language." 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a) (1976).
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cept is new and untested.5" Businesses that have made honest efforts
to comply may rest with almost complete security that they will not
be found in violation.
Lawyers need not worry about problems of court interpretation of
the simplified language. If disputes do occur, judges should define
terms on the basis of their everyday meanings. The outrage ex-
pressed by lawyers of the possibility that they will no longer be able
to rely on "established" court meanings is based on an illusion
because "with each change of circumstance, [court meanings] are
prodded, stretched, squeezed and reshaped." 5'
Notwithstanding any vagueness in the standard of the language
to be used, there are several provisions of the law which act as a
safeguard against the risk of unjust harm to business.2 In fact, the
penalties and damages alone do not provide a sufficient threat to
insure compliance. However, other motivations exist to encourage
compliance. Most businesses are interested in obeying the law and
fostering good will. Thus it seems safe to anticipate that the benefits
of the broad standard will justify its implementation in the New
York law.
B. The Scope of the Law
There has been debate over which contracts are covered by the
Plain English Law.53 The law explicitly covers written agreements
"for the lease of space to be occupied for residential purposes, or to
which a consumer is a party and the money, property or service
which is the subject of the transaction is primarily for personal,
family or household purposes."5" It is unclear whether this language
should be construed to cover insurance and real estate contracts
other than leases.
The debate hinges on legislative intent. It could be argued that
real estate and insurance contracts are included by virtue of the fact
that they are not excluded and that the statute was meant to be
50. The court did not find violations in either of the first two Plain English cases although
it seems that they easily could have. Newport Apts. Co. v. Collins, N.Y.L.J. May 16, 1979,
at 13, col. 3; Francis Apts. v. McKittrick, N.Y.L.J. June 6, 1979, at 11, col. 5.
51. D. MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW 375 (1963).
52. See text accompanying notes 19 & 20 supra.
53. See articles and reports cited in notes 5 & 35 supra.
54. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-702(2) (McKinney Supp. 1978)..
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interpreted broadly. On the other hand, by showing that New York
has separate statutes covering these contracts5 and that they have
traditionally been regarded as separate from the area of consumer
contracts, one could argue for the exclusion of real estate and insur-
ance contracts. In his commentary to the statute, Richard Givens
offers other arguments for the exclusion of real estate contracts. He
states that express coverage of leases would have been unnecessary
if all real estate contracts were covered and that real estate is
treated separately in other sections of the New York General Obliga-
tions Law.5"
It would be safer and more in keeping with the spirit of the law
to assume coverage. An amendment to the New York Insurance Law
which would require plain English and clear up any doubts is pres-
ently under consideration."
C. Conflicts With Other Laws
It has been claimed that the Plain English Law conflicts with
other existing state laws.58 Some statutes require the use of certain
words or phrases which may or may not conform to the standard set
forth in the Plain English Law.5 It was feared that in complying
with these laws, businesses would violate the new law. Although the
amended version of the law clearly resolves this apparent conflict
by specifically exempting words or phrases otherwise required,1e it
could have been resolved solely through the application of some
basic legal principles. When two state laws conflict, the more spe-
cific law always takes precedence, absent a contrary expression of
55. N.Y. INs. LAW (McKinney 1966); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW (McKinney 1968).
56. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-702 commentary at 18 (McKinney Supp. 1978).
57. Telephone interview with Assemblyman Peter M. Sullivan (Sept. 18, 1979).
58. See articles and reports cited in note 35 supra. Friedman, An Argument for Repeal of
Plain English Law, N.Y.L.J. March 7, 1978, at 1, col. 4.
59. Friedman mentions several laws which he felt conflicted with the Plain English Law.
Our Real Property Law provides statutory constructions of clauses commonly contained in
mortgages and deeds. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §§ 253, 254, 258 (McKinney 1968). Truth in
Lending requires the use of the terms "annual percentage rate" and "finance charge" and
allows the use of "Rule of 78." 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1666 (1976). The Internal Revenue Code
requires specific technical terms. I.R.C. § 408(a). Insurance Law gives the superintendent of
the Insurance Department jurisdiction to approve insurance policy language. N.Y. INS. LAW
§ 141 (McKinney 1966). See also Friedman, An Argument for Repeal of Plain English Law,
N.Y.L.J. March 7, 1978, at 1, col. 4.
60. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-702(a) (McKinney Supp. 1978).
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intent.' The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution62
resolves any conflict with federal laws. Hence, when certain words
are required by law, the Plain English Law is rendered inapplicable.
This limitation does not undermine the effectiveness of the law.
Most laws which require specific words are aimed at clarity for the
consumer, an objective in complete harmony with the Plain English
Law. In any case, the law is aimed primarily at contracts whose
language is not governed by other laws. The amended law does not
exempt words "permitted" or "approved" by other laws from its
requirements for the simple reason that the demands of both laws
can be met.
The first case 3 dealing with the Plain English Law was a holdover
proceeding in Queens Housing Court based on the tenants' refusal
to sign a renewal lease. The tenants asserted the defense that they
were entitled to a plain English lease. The court held that a landlord
could not comply with both the Plain English Law and Section 60
of the Rent Stabilization Code" which requires that landlords offer
renewal leases on the same terms and conditions as the previous
lease.'-'
This uncertainty has now been clarified by an amendment to the
Rent Stabilization Code" which states that tenants may receive
renewal leases in plain English if they request them. The second
61. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-702, commentary at 18 (McKinney Supp. 1978). See also
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-51 (1974).
62. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
63. Newport Apts. Co. v. Collins, N.Y.L.J. May 16, 1979, at 13, col. b.
64. Sections YY51-1.0 to YY51-6.0.3 of the New York City Administrative Code are re-
ferred to as the "Rent Stabilization Law." Section YY51-6.0 of the Rent Stabilization Law
authorizes the establishment of a real estate industry stabilization association. Pursuant to
this section, the Real Estate Industry Stabilization Association of New York City, Inc. was
created. This association was required to adopt a "code for stabilization of rents." (NEw
YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § YY51-6.0(b)(2) (1974)). The Real Estate Industry Stabilization
Association of New York City, Inc. has adopted such a code which is printed as an appendix
to N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § YY51-6.0 (McKinney 1974) (the "Rent Stabilization Code").
65. In his decision Judge Harbater stated that if the Legislature intended that plain
English leases be allowed under section 60 of the Rent Stabilization Law, that should have
been stated. Newport Apts. Co. v. Collins, N.Y.L.J. May 16, 1979, at 13, col. 3.
66. See 107 Crry RECORD 966, 967 (April 6, 1979). The amendment was approved by the
Department of Housing Preservation and Development. Id. The amendment provides that
"upon the request of and with the consent of the tenant, the terms and conditions of a renewal
lease entered into after Nov. 1, 1978 may be written in clear language and appropriately
divided and captioned as required by Section 5-702 of the Gen. Oblig. Law." Id.
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plain English case67 was decided in accordance with the amendment
but the judge did state that it was incumbent upon tenants to
request leases in plain English. 8
D. Enforcement
The provisions of the law which deal with enforcement have been
subject to attack from both proponents and opponents of the law.
Those opposed to the law fear that it will subject businesses to
liability for large penalties and unlimited damages in addition to
the costs of reviewing all their forms.6" Although the law provides
for a good faith defense to penalties, businesses may still be liable
for damages despite honest efforts to comply. Some have called for
extension of the good faith defense to suits for damages.70 These
fears, however, are unjustified. In addition to the good faith defense
to penalties, in a class action, the total penalty imposed may not
exceed ten thousand dollars." Furthermore, violations will not ren-
der any agreement void or constitute a defense to actions for en-
forcement or breach of the agreement.7"
At the same time, those in favor of the law argue that the limita-
tions on its enforcement have rendered the law almost ineffectual."
They claim there is little incentive for a consumer to sue and the
penalties for non-compliance are minimal in comparison to the
amount most corporations spend on any given day. These are valid
concerns, but considering the novel and untested nature of the law,
the legislature was well-advised to aim the law more at encouraging
67. Francis Apt. v. McKittrick, N.Y.L.J. June 6, 1979, at 11, col. 5.
68. Id. This case was a non-payment proceeding in which the tenant moved pursuant to
the amended section 60 of the Rent Stabilization Code, requesting that the terms on a three-
year renewal lease be rewritten in clear language. The court held that the Plain English Law
mandates that the lease be rewritten, but only when the tenant exercises his option in
requesting the lease. Id.
69. See Friedman, The Plain English Law-Amended, But Not Improved, N.Y.L.J. June
22, 1978, at 1, col. 1; Report of the N.Y. County Law. Ass'n, Special Committee on Consumer
Agreements 1 (Nov. 7, 1977).
70. See note 69 supra.
71. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-702(a) (McKinney Supp. 1978).
72. Id. § 5-702(b).
73. Biskind, Write It Right, The Principle's The Thing, N.Y.L.J. Oct. 20, 1977, at 2, col.
3. See Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Special Committee on Consumer Affairs (March,
1978). The Committee feels that to be meaningful, the legislation must provide consumers
with an incentive to enforce their rights. This does not exist because of the minimal penalties
and limitations on enforcement. Id. at 8.
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compliance than at punishing offenders. These fears may have been
somewhat allayed by the amended law which grants the Attorney
General the power to act on a violation."
IV. A Year of Plain English
It has been a year since the Plain English Law was enacted. None
of the predicted disasters have come to pass. There has not been
mass confusion over the requirements of the law. Instead, there are
widespread reports of compliance and most converts to Plain Eng-
lish are quite pleased with the results of revision.75
A survey of more than two hundred retailers, banks, loan associa-
tions, credit unions, finance companies, and real estate firms re-
vealed that seventy-five percent of all respondents had revised or
were revising their documents.7 Revision rates varied from a high
of ninety-seven percent for savings banks to a low of thirty-six per-
cent for real estate firms." Among the main reasons for non-revision
were the simplicity of forms already in use and the use of forms
supplied by regulatory organizations.78 Although most firms would
not have revised their forms if not for the Plain English Law, a large
majority felt that their efforts were worthwhile. Most firms accom-
plished the revision in less than three months. 0 Although almost
half of the firms surveyed did not know how much the project cost
them, twenty-nine percent spent under $1,000 revising forms.8 ' The
features most desirable in the new forms were less technical/legal
language, shorter sentences and paragraphs, and explanations of
technical terms.92
Most firms that have revised their forms have done so chiefly to
comply with the law. In the process the goal of simplification was
subordinated to that of technical compliance and self-protection. 1
74. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5.702(c) (McKinney Supp. 1978).
75. Siegel, Plain English Results, N.Y. Times, April 1, 1979, § 3 (Bus. and Fin.) at 1, col.
6.
76. AUDITS & SURVEYS, INC., PLAIN ENGLISH LAW STUDY: SUMMARY REPORT 6 (March 1979).
77. Id. at 5.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 10.
80. Id. Tabular Appendix, Table 13.
81. Id. Tabular Appendix, Table 16.
82. Id. Tabular Appendix, Table 14.
83. Siegel, Reaction to Plain English Law: Compliance Not Understanding, Nat'l L.J.,
Sept. 10, 1979, at 21, col. 1.
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As a result the revisions may have been undertaken half-heartedly
and not everyone is entirely satisfied with the new forms.84 Those
who simplified their forms on their own initiative before the law was
enacted are noticeably happier with the new forms. 5
The response of consumers is more difficult to. measure. Most
firms have not noticed any strong reaction on the part of consum-
ers.8 It is difficult to determine what percentage of users of new
forms has even been aware of the simpler language; many people no
longer read contracts because they expect legalese. Also, gratitude
is much harder to measure than anger. The law was drafted with
the aim of encouraging compliance and discouraging law suits. The
little case law on the statute suggests that there has been wide-
spread compliance.
The benefits of contracts written in plain English are undeniable.
For the consumer, the obvious benefits are the avoidance of frustra-
tion and unfair surprise. The benefits to business, while not so ob-
vious, are equally worthwhile. Most importantly, the use of plain
English is fundamental good business. The movement should gener-
ate good will and foster confidence and trust in business. Consumers
are much more likely to abide by terms which they understood from
the beginning. Businessmen and employees will spend less time
explaining clauses, answering complaints and defending themselves
in lawsuits. Businesses will be in a much stronger position to enforce
contracts when the consumer's obligations have been clearly spelled
out. The New York law has served as the impetus for a national
movement. The Federal Government has repeatedly endorsed the
aim of plain English. 7 Plain English bills have been passed in Con-
necticut"8 and Maine s' and are under consideration in at least
twenty-seven other states.'0 If significantly different bills are passed
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. AUDITS & SURVEYS, INC., PLAIN ENGLISH LAW STUDY: SUMMARY REPoRT 11 (March 1979).
87. On March 24, 1978, President Carter issued an executive order directing that govern-
ment agencies adopt clear and simple regulations. Exec. Order No. 12044, 43 Fed. Reg. 58
(1978). The order applies to new regulations. The President also directed review of existing
regulations. Id.
88. 1979 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 79-532.
89. 1979 Me. Acts § 483 (to be codified at 10 ME. REV. STAT. ch. 202) (consumer con-
tracts); 1979 Me. Acts § 267 (to be codified at 24 ME. REV. STAT. § 2316) (insurance contracts).
90. Siegel, Plain English Results, N.Y. Times, April 1, 1979, § 3 (Bus. and Fin.) at 1, col.
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in various states, it could present serious problems for companies
doing business in more than one state. Businesses could be required
to use different forms for each different state if some statutes were
more specific than New York's statute.' It has been suggested that
this potential problem would be solved by the passage of a federal
law mandating a uniform standard, if it specifically preempted ov-
erlapping state requirements. Two such bills have been introduced
bu't both would be amendments to the Truth in Lending Act and
would only apply to credit transactions. 3
V. Conclusion
The Plain English Law is not perfect. There are real questions as
to exactly what contracts are covered and how strictly the standard
will be applied in courts. While this uncertainty is viewed as a
weakness by many, the broad standard was intentional. It lends the
law flexibility and the potential to be tailored to afford justice in
varying situations.
The flaws of the Plain English Law are overshadowed by its
triumphs. Its primary goal has already been achieved by virtue of
overwhelming compliance. The most important function of the law
is its recognition of a principle: 4 plain language is desirable and
achievable in consumer contracts. This is no small accomplishment.
It is hoped that the movement will spread to other areas of legal
writing.
Critics of the present law have not given up the battle to have the
law repealed or amended. Several bills have been introduced into
the legislature, but none have gone further than committees." Al-
though some of the recommendations seem worth considering, most
91. See note 38 supra, for specific guidelines. The Connecticut Plain Language Bill offers
a choice of either a general standard, very similar to New York's, or a specific standard which
describes layout and sets guidelines on numbers of words and syllables. If the specific stan-
dard were mandatory, there could be conflicts with other state laws which adopted a specific
standard.
92. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-702, commentary at 20. (McKinney Supp. 1978).
93. Siegel, Plain English Results, N.Y. Times, April 1, 1979, § 3 (Bus. and Fin.) at 4, col.
4.
94. Biskind, Write It Right, The Principle's The Thing, N.Y.L.J. October 20, 1977, at 2,
col. 3.
95. One lawyer has conceived of and implemented a plain English will. See Cusack, The
Blue-Pencilled Will, 118 TRUSTS AND ESTATES No. 8 at 33 (August 1979).
96. Telephone interview with Assemblyman Peter M. Sullivan (Sept. 18, 1979).
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have been trivial and overly technical. 7 The law is effective as it
stands. Changes are not necessary and the confusion they would
create would not be justified at this point.
While legal writing is and must continue to be an art of its own,
there is no reason why lawyers should not adhere to and benefit from
the age-old advice of respected English stylists such as William
Strunk, Jr. who continually call for "cleanliness, accuracy, and
brevity in the use of English."' 8
Rosemary Moukad
97. Some of the suggestions of the Law Revision Commission are: replace "coherent" with
"comprehensible"; require eight point type size; exempt language "approved" by other
statutes; limit liability to those who knew or should have known that the transaction was for
personal, family or household purposes; limit damages to those suffered from the non-
compliance; and deny recovery to those who were not fooled by the language of the contract.
Recommendation of the Law Revision Commission to the Legislature Relating to the Clarifi-
cation of Plain Language Requirements for Certain Consumer Agreements, [1978] N.Y. LAW
REV. COMM'N REP., reprinted in [1979] McKinney's Session Law News A-48.
98. W. STRUNK, JR. & E. WHITE, THE ELEMENTS OF STYLE Vii (2d ed. 1972).
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